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Abstract
The military is one of the instruments that states use in the implementation of for-
eign policy within the security domain. As an arm of service, the South African Navy is 
the instrument of implementation of foreign policy in the maritime domain, playing a 
role in maritime safety and security as well as environmental protection.1
Although the concept of a maritime foreign policy is not defined in the literature, 
Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi2 propose a working definition in this publication and it is 
against the background of this definition that the article reports on the traditional roles 
and classification of navies against the practical reality of an evolving maritime security 
context. The discussion then turns towards the maritime threats specific to the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) while considering South Africa’s impor-
tance within the region and consequent maritime security responsibility. Considering 
the SADC Maritime Security Strategy and South Africa’s response to maritime insecu-
rity, the study on which this article reports, questioned whether the South African Navy 
is in fact equipped to deliver on South Africa’s maritime foreign policy in its current de 
facto role of maritime diplomacy. 
MARITIME SECURITY: ROLES AND CLASSIFICATION OF NAVIES
The numerous frameworks within which navies function and the divergent roles 
they play within a foreign policy framework depend largely on the maritime security 
context within which they function. This section discusses a matrix for maritime securi-
ty, considering the various naval functions and their consequent classification. 
A matrix for maritime security
Bueger3 examined the definition of maritime security and provides a maritime se-
curity matrix, which specifies different dimensions for the maritime security concept. 
In this approach, maritime security is placed in the centre of the matrix with national 
security, the marine environment, economic development and human security as the 
outer functions in order to maintain good order at sea. The elements of sea power, ma-
rine safety, blue economy and human resilience underpin these functions and direct the 
tasks or functions of maritime forces.
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Since maritime security defies definition, the matrix in Figure 1 below should be 
seen as an analytical tool used to understand the functions and interrelatedness of the 
different concepts and actors in this environment. One could therefore analyse the roles 
and functions of navies and coastguards in terms of the matrix by determining its focus 
on and actions against maritime security threats, such as accidents, pollution, smug-
gling, terrorist acts, arms proliferation, interstate disputes, human trafficking, piracy and 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The matrix focuses on the holistic 
nature of maritime security.
MARINE ENVIRONMENT




















Figure 1: Maritime security matrix4
Naval functions
As instruments of foreign policy within the Bueger matrix, Booth5 (augmented by 
James Holmes6 and Ben Lombardi7) describes the functions of the navy as a trinity 
where the use of the sea is seen as the binding factor. The three sides of the trinity elu-
cidate the three functions or roles of navies as military, diplomatic and policing, thereby 
providing navies with their purpose. Figure 2 graphically depicts the trinity of functions, 
































1. Coast Guard Responsibilities
2. Nation Building
1. Balance of Power Functions
2. Projection of Force Functions
Figure 2: Booth’s roles of navies8
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The military role at the base of the triangle is symbolic of the military character 
of its primary role, providing navies with the ability to threaten or use force thereby 
giving substance to the other (secondary) roles. The diplomatic role supplements for-
eign policy short of the actual employment of force, strengthening a nation’s position 
in particular situations or in general international dealings. The policing role relates to 
the enforcing of sovereignty over the state’s own maritime frontiers and is not normally 
concerned with the armed forces of another state. 
Booth emphasises that the different sides of the triangle do not denote equal impor-
tance. Different states will confer more importance to each function depending on their 
own maritime challenges and interests.
Military role 
The military role, as the primary role of most navies, comprises both peace and war 
operations. Manganyi9 divides this military role into two categories. He refers to combat 
operations at sea (which includes functions, such as intelligence gathering, surveillance 
and interdiction) and combat operations from the sea where the navy provides amphib-
ious operations and gunfire support. Navies capable of fulfilling this role would also be 
able to fulfil its policing role.
Policing role 
In its broadest sense, the policing role refers to coastguard responsibilities and 
nation building. This function or role mainly takes place within territorial waters and 
broadly relates to the maintenance of public order. It is generally accepted as military 
aid to civil authority. 
Coastguard responsibilities are the most important aspects of policing and comprise 
the defence of sovereignty, the protection of resources in the adjacent areas as well as 
the maintenance of good order at sea. These responsibilities do not fall within the exclu-
sive purview of navies and states may task any separate maritime authority, the navy or 
a combination of these for fulfilment of these responsibilities.
Nation building relates to the use of naval forces in internal stability during natural 
or political turmoil. Although not prevalent, navies could make useful contributions 
during natural disasters or civil turmoil, and play a limited role in modernisation in 
some developing countries. 
Although Booth contends that the policing role will never be an important mis-
sion to blue water navies, more than one third of the world’s navies, coastguards and 
nation-building responsibilities are primarily focused on this function. For most other 
nations, such as South Africa, who do not foresee an external maritime threat or who 
lack the capacity to combat such threats, the secondary role of policing becomes one 
of their navy’s major roles. Such nations thus depend on international stability for the 
defence of their maritime zones. 
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Diplomatic role 
Historically, this role has been an important one for major navies and has evolved 
into a variety of tasks. These tasks range from those with implicit or explicit coercion 
(negotiation from a position of strength) to those promising reward (naval aid) and those 
improving relationships (influence and prestige). The main functions of the diplomatic 
role are negotiation from a position of strength, manipulation and prestige. Considering 
its participation in bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises, this has become the 
major role of the South African (SA) Navy, overshadowing the military and, arguably 
more relevant, policing roles.
Other views on naval functions
Feldt10 analysed the maritime domain from a civil-military perspective and defines 
the roles of navies in relation to maritime defence and deterrence, crisis response, naval 
diplomacy and maritime capacity building. He contends that specific naval roles would 
cover the entire spectrum from low intensity to war-fighting tasks. 
Leadmark11 extensively elaborates on the roles of navies by drawing from both the 
Booth model and the Grove12 classification of navies, expanding the Booth diagram to 
reflect the following: 
• Command of the Sea 
• Sea Control 
• Sea Denial 
• Battleship Dominance
• Fleet in Being 






















• Maritime Interception Operations
• Peace Support operations






• Track Two diplomacy
• Sovereignty Patrols
• Aid of the Civil Power
• Assitance to Other Government 
Departments
• Search and Rescue




Figure 3: Leadmark maritime security matrix13 
These varied roles and functions of navies provides a framework for classifying na-
vies. The next section discusses the current maritime security situation in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region, focusing on a selection of threats to 
good order at sea and the responses by specifically the SA Navy as arguably the only 
credible naval force in the region14. 
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MARITIME SECURITY IN THE SADC REGION
This section will elucidate the current maritime security situation in the SADC re-
gion by highlighting the threats experienced, the continental and regional strategic ini-
tiatives to counter such threats as well as the unilateral and regional actions taken by the 
SA Navy to mitigate the threats. 
Maritime threats to SADC
Due to its geographical location and perceived capacity, South Africa is regarded 
as an important role player in SADC maritime security. Maritime threats of SADC can 
thus conceivably be seen as maritime threats of South Africa, with South African for-
eign policy consequently influencing what is happening in the SADC.
Good order at sea requires the creation of collaborative maritime security archi-
tectures to allow the conduct of free trade in a safe and secure environment, allowing 
the blue economy to flourish. This architecture strengthens maritime institutions, en-
abling such institutions to regulate the fishing industry better, enhance actions against 
illegal acts such as piracy, smuggling, illicit trade and cross-border crime, combatting 
environmental threats such as plastics pollution, as well as ensuring safe navigation of 
shipping.15
Piracy and armed robbery 
Whilst a lack of maritime domain awareness increases the likelihood of piracy in-
cidents, the notoriously rough seas and inhospitable coasts in the SADC area of opera-
tions inhibit such incidents.16 Incidents of piracy or attempted piracy and armed robbery 
at sea are however not new to SADC waters. This is clearly illustrated by the 2010 at-
tacks on two fishing vessels close to the coast of Mozambique as well as reported failed 
incidents off the coast of Beira.17 On the west coast of Africa, the oil tanker MT Kerala 
was hijacked off Angola in January 2014, and returned one week later after diesel worth 
around US$8 million had been stolen, raising concerns of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea possibly spreading southward from the Gulf of Guinea.18
Maritime terrorism 
The relative prosperity and weak institutional systems of the SADC region create an 
attractive environment and target for transnational terrorist groups. The threat of global 
terrorism in Southern Africa is a further matter of concern due to the known connections 
between this region and terrorist activity in Africa and beyond. Long and porous borders 
exacerbated by weak governance, the growing radicalisation of the Southern African 
migrant populations as well as the local Muslim communities can be seen as contribut-
ing factors of a climate conducive to international terrorism and spill-over effects that, 
although more landward focused, do not exclude the sea.19
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Trafficking and smuggling 
The SADC region is prone to human trafficking due to the vulnerabilities created 
by war, poverty, absence of facilities for health and education, gender and economic 
inequality as well as unemployment.20 
Mozambique and Angola have been identified as two major trafficking hubs in 
the SADC, with human trafficking in Madagascar increasing significantly since 2009, 
mainly due to the political crisis in the island nation.21 Tanzania has further been identi-
fied as one of the five leading conduits for illicit drug trafficking in the region; the others 
being Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Angola.22 
The absence of adequate patrol capabilities in harbours and coastal waters of the 
SADC will exacerbate the occurrence of human and other trafficking or smuggling. 
Traditionally considered a landward threat, countries have only recently turned their 
attention offshore. In this context, Mozambique has signed an agreement in September 
2013 to purchase six patrol and interceptor vessels for its navy designed for anti-piracy 
and anti-terrorism activities and countering illicit trafficking.23 
Illegal fishing and poaching 
Fishing provides a major source of protein to the continent, and any threat to the 
sector will be a major threat to the food security on the continent as a whole.24 Statistics 
indicate that South Africa, Angola, Namibia and Tanzania are the major actors in this 
sector. While the Tanzanian growth can be attributed to the scale of the tuna industry 
in the Indian Ocean, the sectors in South Africa, Namibia and Angola are all positively 
influenced by the rich supply of fish in the cold Benguela Current on the west coast.25 
The IUU fishing in the region has been influenced by the decimation of the Patago-
nian tooth fish stocks in the Southern Oceans since 1998, the use of gill nets in the coast-
al waters of mainly Mozambique for sharks, fishing far beyond the mandate of allocated 
quotas, and the use of illegal gear, such as fine mesh nets and even dynamite. The effect 
of IUU fishing in the region can be felt in the economic, ecosystem and social spheres.26 
Due to the nature of IUU, it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information on 
any such activities. The annual loss associated with IUU in the SADC is estimated at ap-
proximately US$50 million for Angola, US$40 million for Mozambique and US$37 for 
Madagascar. While statistics for South Africa and Namibia are not readily available, it is 
agreed that the loss would be worse than in the remainder of the SADC member states.27
Inefficient and insecure commercial ports 
The maritime sector plays a major role in the economic well-being of all littoral 
countries and significantly influences the economies of landlocked countries as well. 
Problems experienced at any of the ports of the region would have a negative effect 
on the economies across the region. Some of the identified threats to port security are: 
theft and hijacking of ships or service vessels, use of ships to transport illegal goods 
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or persons, blockage of the port, and the use of ships tied up alongside the harbour as 
weapons.28 More than 65% of attacks against ships take place while they are at anchor 
in or alongside any given port, encompassing acts of corruption (including extortion and 
collusion with criminal elements) and sea robbery. These very acts need to be curtailed 
in order to ensure adequate port security.29 
Continental and regional strategic initiatives
The Brenthurst foundation postulates that maritime security is a key component of 
collective security which directly affects economic prosperity30.  Kornegay similarly 
states that the range of maritime security challenges and its international implications 
should focus the attention on a continental and regional approach to address the interre-
gional and continental maritime challenges around the coast of Africa31. No one country 
can thus tackle maritime security on its own.  What is needed in this regard is continen-
tal and specifically regional direction and cooperation.
Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050)
AIMS 2050, adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2012, recognises the vast poten-
tial for wealth creation in the maritime domain for the continent, that all member states 
have common maritime challenges, opportunities and responsibilities, requiring the 
requisite political will for implementing a common strategy. An AIMS 2050 Task Force 
was created in 2011 with the task of establishing a Department of Maritime Affairs (to 
develop and coordinate all policy implementation). Each regional economic community 
(REC) within the AU is also required to have a focal point and to establish a steering 
committee as well as develop an evaluation and monitoring tool.32 
AIMS 2050 further charges the RECs to “develop, coordinate and harmonise poli-
cies and strategies and improve African maritime security and safety standards as well 
as the African maritime economy.33
The SADC Maritime Security Strategy 
Due to its geographical position on the Cape sea route linking the Atlantic and In-
dian oceans, the South African economy relative to that of other SADC states, its mari-
time infrastructures and its capacity to deal with maritime security challenges, make the 
country the ideal candidate for taking the initiative in responding to challenges to good 
order at sea within the SADC region. South Africa therefore took the lead in developing 
an SADC maritime security strategy, endorsed by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security34, on 14 June 2011. The SADC maritime security strategy to counter mar-
itime insecurity in SADC’s Indian Ocean region focuses the strategy on the elimination 
of piracy in the SADC’s Eastern Indian Ocean. The strategy has not yet been released 
publicly but cites three priorities: the eradication of Somali piracy in Southern Africa; 
securing the west coast of Southern Africa; and securing Southern Africa’s vast rivers 
and lakes.35
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The strategy could be seen as ‘South Africa-driven’ and reflects mostly South Af-
rican interests while highlighting the country’s dichotomy in the region – balancing 
South Africa’s geo-strategic motives as self-appointed rescuer in the region while not 
adequately addressing domestic challenges in respect of other maritime security issues, 
such as trafficking, IUU fishing, environmental protection and disaster response.36 Al-
though the SADC maritime security strategy is titled “maritime security strategy”, it 
does not adequately address the whole ambit of maritime insecurity and may thus be 
insufficient to deal with the holistic concept of good order at sea.37 The execution of the 
strategy resulted in the formation of a SADC maritime task force (Operation Copper), 
which focused almost exclusively on anti-piracy operations.38 
South African responses to maritime insecurity
The maritime security dimension of South Africa’s foreign policy relates to good 
order at sea in order to support the blue economy so as to achieve socio-economic de-
velopment, and is operationalised through Operation Phakisa.
Maritime policy and strategy 
Although South Africa took the lead in developing the SADC maritime security 
strategy, the country does not have an integrated national maritime security policy or 
strategy of its own. Despite numerous attempts to develop such a policy or strategy 
and general consensus that a coherent national-interest framework is required in order 
to take a proactive stance in maritime security affairs, neither an integrated maritime 
security policy or strategy has ever been implemented officially. Instead, various gov-
ernment departments have developed their own policies and strategies.39 
Maritime border safeguarding 
The South African Defence Review 2014 states, “South Africa’s borders and stra-
tegic installations will be safeguarded40 by the Defence Force in conjunction with other 
Departments”. It further states, “Defence will assume full responsibility for land, air and 
maritime border safeguarding” and that “[t]his will be pursued with Defence leading all 
collaborative efforts concerning safeguarding on the border-line41 and the immediate 
rear areas.”42 This is a fundamental departure from the Defence Review of 1998, in 
that in this latter review, the responsibility for border safeguarding was allocated to the 
South African Police Service.
Maritime border safeguarding is currently conducted by the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) under the auspices of Operation Corona, which plans and 
conducts land, sea and air border-line safeguarding as a component of the defence of 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of South Africa, the domestic 
layer of defence in the layered defence concept of the SANDF.43 The maritime border 
safeguarding concept for the short and medium term focuses on deterrence and the 
enforcement of state authority at sea from the territorial sea out to the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and later to the extended continental shelf. This will be done through the 
ad hoc deployment of naval and air assets supported by Maritime Domain Awareness 
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(MDA). The concept also sanctions the ad hoc deployment of maritime surface and air 
assets into adjacent waters of Namibia and Mozambique during approved multinational 
operations to extend deterrence beyond South African waters and to enhance MDA.44 
Although the border safeguarding concept prescribes collaboration with other 
government departments and agencies, of which 18 departments and agencies bear re-
sponsibility for some form of border control or another, many academics and security 
practitioners believe that mere co-ordination between departments and agencies is not 
sufficient, and have been calling for a more integrated approach to border safeguarding.45 
Consequently, a border management authority (BMA) was created to house all border 
functions under one entity, headed by the Department of Home Affairs. Although this 
may be seen as a step in the right direction, the proposed BMA has not been welcomed 
by other government departments responsible for certain border management functions. 
Arguments range from a too broad mandate to what is regarded as an interference with 
the constitutionally mandated function of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The 
Bill to establish the BMA has been languishing in the parliamentary process for nine 
years, with departmental infighting hampering its successful implementation.46 The es-
tablishment of the BMA might have a major influence on the roles and responsibilities 
of the SAPS, the SANDF and the SA Navy in particular. As it is envisaged that the 
BMA will function as a separate armed service, the extent of the influence will depend 
on whether the BMA will remain responsible for ports of entry only, as speculated, or 
whether it will assume responsibility for patrolling all borders, including the maritime 
border up to the extent of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).47 
Maritime domain awareness (MDA) 
MDA is a crucial component in the concept for maritime border safeguarding and 
maritime defence. To this end, the SA Navy is in the process of establishing Maritime 
Domain Awareness Centres (MDACs) in Durban and Cape Town respectively. These 
MDACs will eventually link with Maritime Security Centres (MSCs) that are being 
established in Tanzania and Mozambique. MSCs are also being established in Angola 
and Namibia, but are not yet linked, with Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe having established operational frameworks to facilitate the necessary links 
with MDACs and MSCs.48
Various other government departments and agencies in South Africa possess da-
tabases, information centres and coordination facilities that are relevant to MDA. Al-
though these departments and agencies are linked and share information to some de-
gree, there is no formal process to fuse the information and data, or to do integrated 
analyses regarding possible threats and risks.
Memorandum on tripartite maritime security 
A memorandum of understanding (MoU) on maritime security co-operation be-
tween South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania was signed in February 2012 in an ef-
fort to secure sea borders and tackle the problem of maritime piracy. It was believed that 
this effort would also reduce trafficking and illegal fishing. It allowed for multifaceted 
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maritime security operations, such as information sharing, surveillance, conducting 
joint military exercises and operations, patrolling, hot pursuit, arrest and search and sei-
zure.49 Tanzania withdrew from the MoU early in 2013, while Mozambique continued 
to provide personnel on board SA Navy ships involved in Operation Copper.50 
Search and rescue (SAR) 
A multilateral agreement between South Africa, Madagascar, the Comoros and Mo-
zambique, signed in 2007, makes provision for co-operation in SAR in areas adjacent to 
the coast.51 The main Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) for Navarea VII 
is in Silvermine with sub-centres in Walvis Bay, Durban, Dar es Salaam and the Sey-
chelles. The responsibility regarding the international convention for the safety of life at 
sea (SOLAS) is associated with the Department of Transport (South African Maritime 
Safety Authority [SAMSA]) in South Africa with the department having a permanent 
seat at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) There is however no coordination 
with the South African National Hydrographic Organisation (SANHO). It would seem 
that the regional coordination is problematic while international co-operation is very 
successful.52 
Promoting safe passage 
As a member of the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) since 1951, 
SANHO has been tasked with the charting of region H (a large ocean area around 
Southern Africa stretching all the way to Antarctica), contributing to charting for region 
M (Antarctica) and coordination of maritime safety information. South Africa drew up 
a hydrographic co-operation plan for the Standing Maritime Committee of the SADC, 
which is currently in force, and urged member states to apply for membership of the 
IHO.53 The Southern Africa and Islands Hydrographic Commission (SAIHC) was es-
tablished in 1996 with SADC members being members or associate members. The aim 
of the SAIHC is to improve hydrography in the region with the focus on capacity build-
ing. In the SADC maritime area, South Africa produces hydrographic information for 
Namibia and its own shores, while Portugal covers Angola, France covers Madagascar, 
India covers the Seychelles and the United Kingdom covers Mozambique and Tanzania. 
Mozambique has a very small hydrographic office, but has no production capability.54
Exercises and symposia 
In its maritime diplomacy role, South Africa participates in a number of maritime 
exercises. Interop East/West is held annually along the coast of Africa. Although initi-
ated by South Africa, all SADC member states are encouraged to send representatives. 
The exercise focuses on search and rescue, ship safety exercises, seamanship and joint 
and multilateral co-operation. Exercise Good Tidings, an exercise in riverine operations, 
was held in Malawi in September 2011 with further similar SADC-sanctioned exercises 
scheduled in other member states annually. The SA Navy participates biannually in Ex-
ercises Ibsamar (India, Brazil and South Africa) and Atlasur (South Africa, Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay). These exercises facilitate interoperability, enhance readiness and 
develop doctrine, tactics and operating procedures. Plans are at an advanced stage to 
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invite navies on the African west coast to Exercise Atlantic Tidings, which would run 
parallel with the aforementioned exercises. As part of the Standing Maritime Committee 
of the SADC, the participating countries discuss force support co-operation plans, naval 
training co-operation plans, hydrographic co-operation plans and naval coordination 
and guidance of shipping co-operation plans.55
The need for a maritime platform to raise and discuss maritime issues common to 
Africa led to the Seapower for Africa Symposium (SPAS) concept, initiated by chiefs 
of navies of Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa in 2003 at an International Sea 
Power Symposium in Rhode Island, USA. The first such symposium was held in Cape 
Town in August 2005 where 23 African nations attended with subsequent symposia held 
in Nigeria and planned for the rest of Africa. The common themes discussed at these 
symposia are: 
•	 charting Africa’s maritime zones; 
•	 piracy and maritime crime off the coast of Africa;
•	 patrol and control of Africa’s vast maritime hydrocarbon resources;
•	 controlling Africa’s maritime choke points;
•	  enhancing African maritime regional maritime co-operation: areas of scien-
tific and technology support; and
•	 maritime, inland waters and riverine disaster management.
The SPAS identified: 
•	  a need for structured continental and regional co-operation to address mat-
ters of maritime security and governance; 
•	  the need to maximise potential areas of continental and regional co-opera-
tion; 
•	  the requirement to establish continental and regional agreements, arrange-
ments and capabilities; 
•	 the inclusion of all landlocked countries in deliberations; and 
•	 the need to capacitate and support the Maritime Office of the AU.
In order to realise the above themes, the SPAS identified:
•	  the need for the generation of a comprehensive maritime security policy for 
Africa;
•	  the recognition of the importance of collective continental and regional own-
ership and support of all issues pertaining to maritime governance; 
•	  the requirement for the harmonisation of laws, policies and institutions to 
facilitate efficient co-operation and collaboration in pursuit of ensuring mari-
time security continentally and regionally; and 
•	  the need to explore the legal framework as a method of providing mechanisms 
of co-operation. 
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The overriding obligation was placed on all African countries to bring to the at-
tention of their people and their governments the critical importance of the maritime 
domain to their economic well-being.56 In spite of the importance of the SPAS concept, 
it lacked longevity and has since become dormant. Revival of the concept may prove 
critical in securing long-term maritime security for Africa and its regions.
The numerous documents and strategies discussed, and the functions and roles con-
tained therein are necessary for the protection of South Africa’s maritime interests as re-
flected in Van Nieuwkerk and Manganyi’s definition57, thereby informing South African 
maritime foreign policy. The discussion now turns to the question whether the SA Navy, 
as an instrument of maritime foreign policy, is in fact equipped to deliver in its current 
format and function, interrogating the utility of navies and coastguard functions. The 
complexity of maritime security coupled with a lack of capacity challenges any African 
state in securing its maritime domain on its own. Consideration is given to the need for 
regional co-operation in pursuit of its delivery on maritime foreign policy.
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY
As far back as 2009, Vogel58 identified the increase in security threats in the African 
maritime domain, exacerbated by the misalignment of the security structures on the 
continent. He contends that intergovernmental partnerships as well as the establishment 
of a coastguard function would be required to address the issue adequately. He pro-
posed five dimensions that differentiate coastguards from navies (summarised in Figure 
4). The final column denotes the current situation in Africa, highlighting the fact that 
most of the maritime forces or organisations relate more closely to coastguards than to 
navies. In his analysis of the current maritime security situation in Africa, Vogel recom-
mends that assets need to be matched to needs, inter-ministerial collaboration needs to 
be enhanced, and nations need to engage in effective capacity building in the maritime 
domain.
Coastguard Navy African maritime forces
Missions Maritime safety, law 
enforcement, environ-
mental protection, and 
border security within 
EEZ
War, international sea 
lanes, and foreign policy 
on high seas or outside of 
national boundaries
Primarily maritime 
safety, law enforcement, 
environmental protection, 
and border security 
within EEZ, some foreign 
policy and peacekeeping 
abroad
Assets Tugs, patrol cutters, 
aids to navigation, 
harbour patrol and 
other small boats, fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft 
for search and rescue, 
interdiction
Amphibious landing 
ships, surface combatants, 





small patrol boats, some 
amphibious landing craft, 
and submarines
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security, department of 
fisheries and oceans, 
ministry of infrastruc-
ture and transport
Ministry or department of 
defence
Ministry or department of 
defence
Training Operations of assets, 
coastguard missions
Operation of assets, war Operations of assets, war
Partnerships National (judicial, 
fisheries, ports, etc.)




Figure 4: Navies vs coastguards (African realities)
Paleri posits that coastguards exist to secure the maritime domain through functions 
not primarily related to war. While navies conduct combat in war situations, coastguards 
perform in “other than war” situations by enforcement and services in the interest of 
the country inside the maritime zones. The coastguard can be classified as an armed 
force with powers of law enforcement but it cannot be classified as a combat force. 
They are mandated to serve the maritime community with its authority embedded in 
the mandate.59
In South Africa, the Department of Defence indicated in 2017 that it was investigat-
ing the possibility of establishing a coastguard over the medium term, but that it would 
be dependent on funding. It stated that some of the functions of the SA Navy could be 
transferred to such a coastguard: 
•	 search and rescue (SA Maritime Safety Authority); 
•	 combating of pollution (Department of Environmental Affairs); 
•	 fishery protection (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery); and 
•	 anti-piracy operations (law enforcement agencies). 
Critics of the above study contend that the SA Navy could continue to perform 
these tasks as part of its secondary function and that the service would lose many of its 
personnel to such an organisation.60 The establishment of such a force would have to be 
done in conjunction with the proposed BMA Bill discussed above and could have dire 
consequences for the SA Navy in this regard. 
Legal framework
In the argument regarding whether a country, or a region for that matter, should 
opt for a navy or a coastguard, and whether the legal framework exists, it would be too 
simplistic to consider only the navy or coastguard as role players within the maritime 
domain. Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
remains the bedrock of all subsequent treaties, declarations and legal frameworks in the 
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maritime domain, it should be noted that it was negotiated at a time when modern ocean 
governance looked different. Ocean governance is no longer the exclusive domain of the 
state.61 There are numerous role players, organisations and government departments that 
play a significant role within the exploitation and protection of the maritime domain. A 
navy or a coastguard would ultimately carry the main responsibility of ensuring security 
of this domain, but what would constitute best practices and an ultimate choice of entity 
would be significantly affected by the relevant role players. At national level, the navy 
and/or coastguard, transport ministries, police services, the judiciary, policymakers and 
civil society, to name a few, all have stakes in the maritime domain. This leads to frag-
mented rules, regulations and operations, executed in specific maritime jurisdictional 
zones in an environment characterised by the trans-border realities of crime and highly 
migratory fish stocks.
Although the maritime environment has traditionally not received the attention giv-
en to matters on land,62 the perceived ‘sea blindness’ of African countries is purportedly 
clearing.63 The literature is clear on the concerted effort of the African Union (AU) and 
other regional organisations to create policy documents, treaties and declarations to 
ensure Africa’s blue economy. As a case in point, AIMS 2050 is a tool in addressing 
Africa’s maritime challenges to ensure sustainable development and foster wealth cre-
ation from Africa’s oceans and inland waterways, in an environmentally sustainable 
manner. With 38 out of the 54 African states being littoral states and two-thirds of its 
equivalent land mass in its maritime zones under the sea, the importance of the maritime 
environment for Africa’s sustainable development cannot be emphasised enough. Over 
90% of its trade is conducted by sea.64 The size of its maritime resources alone is plac-
ing unprecedented strain on the limited maritime security resources individual African 
countries have at their disposal, a matter clearly exacerbated by the proliferation of 
maritime crimes and other security challenges.
The vastness of the maritime borders and the scope of the threat to maritime security 
therefore necessitate co-operation between neighbouring countries and regions if there 
is any hope in securing Africa’s blue economy. The need for regional co-operation has 
been re-iterated at various forums.65 Co-operation is a thread that runs through all the 
conventions and declarations that make up the building blocks of contemporary African 
maritime security.
As stated above, the ultimate framework for maritime security during times of peace 
is UNCLOS.66 Although it is unclear to what extent the provisions of UNCLOS can be 
regarded as customary international law, it has been widely accepted as the blueprint for 
maritime security, and to date has been ratified by 168 parties, 47 of which are African 
states.67 The preamble of UNCLOS sets the tone of co-operation in that it confirms the 
reason behind the rules that govern the sea was –
[A] desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-op-
eration, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the … sig-
nificance of this Convention as an important contribution to the mainte-
nance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world.68
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The spirit of co-operation was taken up in AIMS 2050 with the strategic end state 
of the strategy being –“
Increased wealth creation from the AMD69 that positively contrib-
utes to socio-economic development, as well as increased national, 
regional and continental stability, through collaborative, coordinated, 
coherent and trust-building multi-layered efforts to build block of mar-
itime sector activities in concert with improving elements of maritime 
governance.70
At a regional level, the Djibouti Code of Conduct71 was the first regional attempt 
to address African maritime insecurity, confirming the inability of states to address in-
security on their own and reiterating the need for regional co-operation.72 This Code 
focuses on the repression of piracy within the east coast region of Africa.73 This was 
swiftly followed by the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed 
Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (the 
Yaoundé Declaration74) in order to increase regional co-operation on a number of mari-
time security issues. The Declaration was concluded between the Economic Communi-
ty of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). The Yaoundé Declaration is 
clear in its recognition of co-operation as the preamble refers to –
[The] crucial role of cooperation at the global, regional, sub-region-
al, and bi-lateral levels in combatting, in accordance with internation-
al law, threats to maritime security … [underscores] the importance of 
enhancing international cooperation at all levels to fight transnational 
organized criminal activities.
One such example is the Maritime Organisation of West and Central African States 
(MOWCA), which (in conjunction with the IMO) established an MoU in 2008 on the 
establishment of a sub-regional integrated coastguard network, which proposed joint 
efforts in dealing with maritime security. to date To date, the MoU has been signed by 
16 of the coastal states, and provides a framework for regional maritime co-operation, 
which in turn relates to peace, good order and prosperity in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) 
region.75 The coastguard networks enhance maritime domain awareness, improve 
co-operation and urge increased commitment to treaties, agreements and protocols. It 
was agreed to divide the region into four coastguard zones76 in order to ensure more 
effective coordination while member states were urged to accelerate the establishment 
of such coastguard services under the administration of the relevant administrations to 
support these processes.77
The declarations and conventions mentioned above show that the legal framework 
is in place in order for states to conduct their maritime security, and there is specific 
emphasis on the fact the regional co-operation is critical for successful maritime secu-
rity. As important as AIMS 2050 remains as a strategy for African maritime security, it 
carries no legal weight since it has no binding legal authority to enforce the aims and 
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ideals characterising it. The African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and De-
velopment in Africa78 (the Lomé Charter) legally enforces these ideals.79 The efficacy 
and the challenges regarding the implementation of the Lomé Charter fall outside this 
discussion, but the lack of support by a number of littoral states, such as South Africa 
that have a critical role to play within the maritime security domain, must be noted.80
Overall, in an African context, there is a seemingly sufficient framework, both 
normatively and legally, to support regional co-operation within the maritime domain. 
States may freely enter into bi-lateral or multilateral agreements in order to enhance 
their limited capacity. This is also true for regional organisations. AIMS 2050 specifical-
ly provides for a number of frameworks on a strategic level to assist states in facilitating 
co-operation across states and regions. Article 31 of AIMS 2050 provides, inter alia, for 
a naval component of the African Standby Force (ASF) as well as a continental working 
group of chiefs of African navies and/or coastguards whose task it would be to look at 
matters of maritime domain awareness and uphold co-operation between the navies 
and coastguards of member states. Unfortunately, there has been no discernible prog-
ress towards the implementation of these strategic imperatives. Coupled with the lack 
of support in signing and ratification of the Lomé Charter this raises serious concerns 
regarding the political will to ensure maritime security versus merely paying lip service 
at relevant forums.
Situation in SADC
Placing the SADC as a region under scrutiny, the situation seems dire. In this con-
text, apart from UNCLOS and AIMS 2050, the most relevant documents for creating a 
legal maritime security framework would arguably be the Lomé Charter, the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct with its subsequent Jeddah Amendment (the Amended Djibouti Code 
of Conduct) as well as the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. These documents should 
be considered against the security situation in the region.
Considering data gathered by the Stable Seas Index,81 one can form a clearer pic-
ture regarding the overall security situation within the SADC region. Although Stable 
Seas make use of a number of indicators in determining the overall maritime security 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa, matters of ‘international cooperation’ and ‘maritime 
enforcement’ are of specific interest to this article. In considering the level of interna-
tional co-operation, Stable Seas evaluated African countries on their “commitment to 
multilateral efforts that facilitate maritime security and Governance”.82 Throughout the 
SADC region, states score high in terms of their participation and commitment with 
regard to global agreements, such as UNCLOS and various other international treaties.83 
The picture changes, however, once the focus narrows to continental agreements where 
only five out of 16 SADC countries have signed the Lomé Charter.84 None of them have 
ratified the Charter. At a regional level, Angola has signed the Yaoundé Declaration85 
and only six out of the 16 SADC countries have signed the Jeddah Amendment.
In its evaluation of Africa’s maritime enforcement, the Stable Seas Index considers 
the state of the navies and coastguards of African countries to assess whether they are 
deemed adequate for monitoring the territorial waters and EEZ of the particular state.86 
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In measuring the scope of the need of a particular state in order to control their maritime 
domain properly, all SADC states showed an inadequate ability, with South Africa scor-
ing less than a number of other SADC states, including its close neighbours Namibia 
and Mozambique.87 SADC states generally scored well in terms of their domain aware-
ness88 in their ability to collect, analyse and disseminate information, but once again 
exhibited relatively poor performance in terms of their coastal patrol assets.89 In terms 
of improving its naval capability in building capacity to enhance its maritime capability, 
South Africa is regarded as robust, scoring well above the rest of the SADC states.90 
This would indicate that South Africa should be a leading role player in the SADC 
maritime security domain.
It is against this backdrop that the importance of participation and support of AIMS 
2050, the Jeddah Amendment and the Lomé Charter should be considered. The Stable 
Seas Index shows that SADC has serious problems within the maritime domain on is-
sues such as illicit trade,91 and all forms of trafficking92 but that there are no serious con-
cerns regarding piracy;93 yet, its Maritime Security Strategy is still focused on dealing 
with piracy.94 There does not seem to be any urgency in addressing matters other than 
piracy, even if other transnational crimes pose a more severe risk to SADC maritime 
security. Both the Jeddah Amendment and the Lomé Charter address maritime crimes 
in addition to piracy and urge co-operation between states to counter these threats; yet, 
only six SADC countries have signed the Jeddah Amendment and only five have signed 
the Lomé Charter. This does not bode well for SADC co-operation on matters other 
than piracy. This is especially true for South Africa, a country that should, on paper at 
least, arguably have the most to contribute in terms of capacity and adherence to the 
rule of law.
What should be in place for a regional navy or coastguard?
Any regional navy or coastguard would have to work within a specific mandate. 
This would be possible within the framework provided by AIMS 2050 for a naval com-
ponent to the ASF. Within this framework, one would argue that specific multilateral 
agreements would not be necessary, unless their application would fall outside the pur-
view of the doctrine and mandate of the ASF, which is set out clearly in the AU Consti-
tutive Act. This would limit the application to peace enforcement scenarios, in which 
case a navy would probably be the better option.
It is arguable that the maritime security situation, especially within the SADC re-
gion, would require a large law enforcement component in order to combat the nature of 
the maritime security threats. In terms of limitations often placed on military operations, 
a coastguard would be a viable and legally defensible option in the SADC context.
It is submitted that the SADC is not ready for a regional coastguard or navy. Al-
though the SADC Maritime Security Strategy is in an advanced state of review, the 
current situation is not conducive to such regional co-operation. Royeppen convincingly 
argues that different countries within the SADC region would have different maritime 
practices. This is clear if one considers that the concept of maritime security differs 
from state to state. The SADC will have to reach a common goal, outside the piracy 
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paradigm, that considers all member states, including landlocked states who could, for 
example, be required to contribute to a regional coastguard, even if it is only in terms of 
funding, since they will definitely benefit from such a coastguard.
Ultimately, it would depend on political will – the political will to support existing 
continental and regional declarations and treaties in order to create the international 
legal framework on which to base the regional navy or coastguard. This further im-
plies the political will to implement strategic components, such as the working group 
of chiefs of African navies and/or coastguards, which would be critical in facilitating a 
successful regional force.
CONCLUSION
When classifying navies, one needs to evaluate the maritime security environment 
and functions performed by the various maritime organisations in the sometimes hostile 
maritime domain. Navies normally perform functions relating to military, policing and 
diplomatic requirements as tasked by the state. This article focused on the policing 
functions/roles of navies and how this would be better suited to roles traditionally per-
formed by coastguards. Having a coastguard would allow organisations such as the SA 
Navy to focus on diplomatic functions (and war-fighting preparation) as required by the 
maritime foreign policy alluded to in this article. The reality, however, reflects a navy 
required to but hampered in performing policing (coastguard) functions, more often 
limited to a diplomatic role. This reflects the clear disconnect between the maritime for-
eign policy ideal and what the SA Navy can deliver as an instrument of foreign policy.
African maritime security forces are currently misaligned in meeting the security 
threats they face. They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and training programmes but 
have a predominance of coastguard missions, operate in coastguard zones, and require 
coastguard partnerships. The regional co-operation on the West Coast of Africa has 
clearly shown that regional coastguard operations are possible. The security situation in 
the SADC region reflects the need for a regional coastguard, both in the context of the 
proliferation of transnational crimes other than piracy and the critical lack of capability 
of the individual states. States cannot secure their maritime domains on their own. The 
legal framework for such co-operation already exists. What is absent, however, is the 
political will in the SADC to find a regional solution.
In the absence of regional co-operation, South Africa should play a leading role 
in ensuring maritime security, for South Africa as well as the SADC as a region. The 
nature and roles of navies as well as coastguards are such that, within the South African 
context, it should not be an either/or situation. South Africa needs both a navy and a 
coastguard to allow for its strategic and practical situation – or at the very least should 
consider a hybrid force where the navy and coastguard functions are combined.
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